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8.1 Introduction
Smoking in the United States is associated with enormous costs to
society. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has es-
timated the annual cost of medical care for smoking-related illness at
$15 to $30 billion, and that smoking-related illness is responsible for
an additional $49 to $70 billion in lost productivity. There are also
substantial costs to the individual who smokes in terms of lost wages
over a lifetime, primarily affecting those who die of smoking-related
disease while still active wage earners in the work force. Costs to the
individual also include approximately $500 to $1,000 per annum for
one-pack and two-pack-a-day smokers to purchase cigarettes. An ad-
ditional cost to the individual is the loss of Social Security benefits as
a result of smoking-induced loss of life expectancy. The data presented
herein estimate the magnitude of this loss for single and married men
and women born in 1920 and 1923, respectively.
While most of the previous literature on the costs of smoking and
the benefits of quitting has overlooked the implications of smoking
behavior on pension plans (see, for example, Oster, Colditz, and Kelly
1984), this is by no means universal. Gori, Richter, and Yu (1984)
estimated that the savings realized by Ford Motor Company if the health
of their employees improved (in terms of less expensive medical
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insurance, disability insurance, and life insurance) would be much
smaller than the additional pension costs due to their increased lon-
gevity. Atkinson and Townsend (1977) noted that the financial benefits
the British National Health Service would enjoy if there was a 40
percent reduction in smoking in Britain would be more than offset by
the increased cost of retirement pensions.
In this paper, we examine the Social Security consequences of smok-
ing from the individual or household perspective. From that vantage
point, Social Security can be thought of as a prepaid life annuity. Con-
tributions or taxes are collected during one's work life which entitle
one to an indexed life annuity beginning at age 65. The annuity can be
commenced at age 62 with a roughly fair actuarial adjustment, or it can
be started at an age beyond 65 with somewhat higher benefits reflecting
the shorter expected remaining lifetime. In general, the system is not
actuarially fair (favoring some cohorts relative to others, those with
low incomes or short covered careers relative to others, and marrieds,
especially one-earner couples, relative to singles).
Our point is that the system is unfair in a way very relevant to the
decision of whether or not to smoke. Social Security does not have
separate benefit structures for smokers and nonsmokers, even though
smokers have a much lower chance of reaching retirement age and a
shorter expected length of retirement conditional on reaching that age.
The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment estimated that 273,000 peo-
ple died in the United States in 1982 of smoking-related disease (Kro-
nebusch 1985). Of those, 44 percent, or 121,000, died before they reached
their 65th birthday. They may have never collected anything from So-
cial Security. If they were married, their spouses may collect survivor's
benefits, but it is clear that their premature deaths greatly reduce their
return on their participation in Social Security.
Smoking also affects the Medicare portion of the Social Security
system. While we concentrate on the old-age supplemental income
(OASI) portion in this paper, it is probably worth noting that the health
insurance (HI) component is similarly affected. Many estimates of the
effect of smoking on the total demand for health care services in the
country find that it is small in the long run. Smokers certainly expe-
rience more health problems per year of life, but this is offset by the
fact that they live fewer years. With a lower incidence of smoking,
there would be more elderly who require additional health care ser-
vices. The reduced demand caused by the improved health status of
the former smokers is offset by the extra care needed by the additional
elderly. There might be some initial reduction in the demand for health
care if smoking was reduced. The improvements in health status would
presumably occur before the age structure was significantly altered.
However, in the long run the two effects offset each other.233 The Social Security Cost of Smoking
Despite the fact that total health care demand may be little affected
by smoking, Medicare's finances are almost certainly affected. The
reason is that it is a prepaid health insurance annuity for those over
65. Medicare does not bear the higher health costs of nonelderly smok-
ers, but it benefits financially from the fewer numbers of elderly due
to smoking. The other side of the coin is that smokers pay while they
work for old-age health insurance, as with their retirement benefits,
which they are less likely to collect or likely to collect for a shorter
period than nonsmokers. Wright (1986) estimates that each person who
quits smoking increases the deficit faced by the HI component of Social
Security for just these reasons.
Our study is the OASI analog of Wright's (1986) HI research. We
assemble separate life tables for smokers and nonsmokers and then
estimate the Social Security taxes, benefits, and transfers for members
of the 1920 birth cohort. We do this for those who earn median wages
for their age and cohort and for those who earn 60 percent of the
median, in each case beginning at age 20. The results can be previewed
by saying that we find the expected loss in net Social Security benefits
accompanying smoking to be very large relative to the other costs of
smoking. The loss exceeds the lifetime costs of cigarettes, is large
relative to the estimates of the medical costs and lost wages due to
excess morbidity and mortality, and is perhaps 10 times greater than
the corresponding Medicare figures of Wright.
Section 8.2 briefly reviews what is known about the effect of smoking
on mortality. It discusses disease-specific effects and also our technique
of using mortality ratios to yield approximate separate life tables for
smokers and nonsmokers. Section 8.3 describes our simulation pro-
cedure for calculating the Social Security costs of smoking. It presents
separate results for single individuals and for one-earner and two-earner
couples because of their separate treatment by Social Security. We
conclude the paper with an interpretation of what our findings imply
about the private and social incentives to quit smoking.
8.2 Effect of Smoking on Mortality
There can be no statistical doubt that smoking is associated with
increased mortality hazard rates. The overall finding of the 1979 Sur-
geon General's report on the subject was that the mortality of all male
cigarette smokers is about 170 percent of that of male nonsmokers.
For two-pack-a-day smokers, the average mortality ratio is 200 percent.
For particular diseases the relative hazard is even greater. For example,
two separate studies find smokers are between 9 and 15 times more
likely than nonsmokers to die of lung cancer (Lubin et al. 1984; and
Cowell and Hirst 1980). The risk of dying of arteriosclerotic and234 J. B. Shoven J. 0. Sundberg/J. P. Bunker
degenerative heart disease and myocardial insufficiencies has been es-
timated at 2.7 times as great for smokers as nonsmokers (Cowell and
Hirst 1980). There is further evidence that there is a significant inter-
action between smoking and other environmental factors, such as ex-
posure to asbestos. The finding is that while smoking is a major cause
of lung cancer, smoking combined with other assaults (such as industrial
exposure) greatly increases the mortality hazards (Scheiderman and
Levin 1977).
Our development of separate life tables for smokers and nonsmokers
utilizes the findings of E. C. Hammond (1966) regarding the effect of
smoking on mortality. Working for the American Cancer Society, he
conducted a comprehensive four-year study tracking a population of
over one million subjects. He determined the death rates and the prev-
alence of certain causes of death for smokers and nonsmokers of many
different characteristics. The technique was to examine death certifi-
cates for the cause of death and to request information from the at-
tending doctor whenever cancer was mentioned on the death certificate.
Hammond's results are a very detailed set of mortality ratios
1 for dif-
ferent types of smokers and for several different causes of death.
In 1959 and 1960, Hammond enrolled over one million volunteers
from twenty-five different states to provide data on mortality. Subjects
were classified by sex, age, type of tobacco smoked (cigarette, cigar,
pipe, or none), age at which subject began smoking, daily amount of
smoking, and degree of smoke inhalation. Each subject was contacted
annually for four years to track the number and timing of fatalities in
each group. Death certificates were received for over 97 percent of
reported deaths to provide better information as to causes of death.
Using the accumulated data, Hammond combined subjects with sim-
ilar characteristics into five-year and ten-year age cohorts and divided
the number of deaths in each cohort during the study period by the
number of "person-years" experienced in each cohort. This provided
cohort death rates over the period for groups of similar age and sex
and varying smoking habits. This allowed Hammond to calculate mor-
tality ratios for different groups. A sample of his findings is shown in
table 8.1
The separate mortality tables that we have produced are contained
in the appendix to this paper. The basic life tables used are the cohort
life tables for men and women born in 1920, as estimated by the Social
Security Administration. The mortality hazards are shown in column
(8) of the appendix table for men and women. If we let QA(O) represent
the one-year death probability for males as a function of age (similarly
QA(O) for females), let f
m(a) represent the fraction of men who smoke
as a function of age, and M
m(a) represent the mortality ratio of male






























































Source: Hammond (1966), p. 133.







where Q^s(a) is the annual death probability of male nonsmokers as a
function of age and Q§(a) is the annual death probability for male
smokers. The formulas for women are identical with all the superscripts
changed to w's.
The appendix tables display the assumptions for M
m(a) and M
w(a)
derived from Hammond (1966), and for f
m{a) and f
w{d) for the 1920
cohort derived from Harris (1983). They also show the results for
QNS(O), Q'sia), QNS{O), and Q%{a). Table 8.2 offers some summary
statistics based on these derived life tables.
Our life tables for the 1920 birth cohort show that 85,758 males and
88,787 females out of 100,000 births live to age 20. It is well known
that smoking affects the mortality of women less than men. That is
partially due to the fact that women smokers smoke less, inhale less,
and are more likely to smoke filter cigarettes. Again, out of 100,000
births, 53,051 male smokers (who began smoking at age 20) survive
until age 65, whereas 67,465 male nonsmokers survive until that tra-
ditional retirement age. Conditional on living to age 20, almost 79 per-
cent of nonsmokers make it to 65, whereas slightly less than 62 percent
of smokers do so. At age 20, male smokers have a life expectancy 6.4
years shorter than male nonsmokers, and a median age of death 7 years
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life expectancy which is 2.7 years less than their nonsmoking cohort
members. The figures for women show that the life expectancy differ-
ence at age 20 is 3.3 years, while the difference at age 65 is 2 years.
Our life tables cannot sort out causality and correlation. It is certainly
true that smokers would not become identical to nonsmokers if they
stopped smoking. Smokers drink more alcohol than nonsmokers, have
a higher incidence of suicide, and, in general, may face higher mortality
risks than nonsmokers for reasons correlated with smoking but not
caused by smoking per se. We have not been able to separate these
effects, although it is our belief that most of the higher mortality risks
faced by smokers are due directly to the cigarette consumption. How-
ever, it should be kept in mind when interpreting our results that we
have attributed all of the mortality difference to the cigarette
consumption.
8.3 Simulation of the Social Security Costs of Smoking
We examine the Social Security consequences of smoking for 100,000
men born in 1920 and 100,000 women born in 1923. The three-year
difference approximates the average age gap in marriage for this cohort.
The 1920 cohort life tables compiled by Social Security are taken to
be applicable to the men and women in our study. We calculate the
Social Security outcomes separately for single men, single women, and
one-earner and two-earner couples. We assume that each person's
probability of death is given by the life tables and, therefore, is inde-
pendent of the status of the spouse. The number of women who become
widowed in each year until the husbands retire is noted, and each
"widow cohort" is then tracked as a separate population. This is nec-
essary because at retirement widows must choose between a benefit
based on their own work record and one based on that of their spouses.237 The Social Security Cost of Smoking
In the case of the one-earner couples, we assume that the husband is
employed until retirement or death. If the husband should die before
retirement, the widow is assumed to work until retirement or death.
We have not been very sophisticated in developing our earnings
profiles. The earnings series used are median earnings for men and
women working full-time year-round, taken from the 1982 Census Bu-
reau Current Population Report P-60, no. 142. Earnings before 1955
and 1982 are estimated using a related series from the Department of
Labor's Employment, Hours, and Earnings Report. The earnings series
are then adjusted to reflect a life-cycle pattern of lifetime earnings,
using 1982 Census data on mean incomes for different age groups from
Current Population Report P-60, no. 137. Our analysis for low-wage
earners examines those who earn 60 percent of the median earnings
profiles.
There are several factors which could be added to our earnings series.
First, we do not take into account the effect of the increased morbidity
of smokers on their earnings pattern. This is probably a relatively minor
adjustment, but one which is conceptually desirable. Second, non-
working wives entering the work force when widowed are assumed to
immediately earn the median (or 60 percent of the median) amount for
their age. This is certainly optimistic regarding their prospects. Finally,
we do not take into account spells of unemployment, employment in
the uncovered sector, or disability.
The surviving members of the cohort are assumed to retire at age
65 and begin to receive benefits based on the 1985 Social Security law.
We assume that the initial benefit received is fully indexed for inflation
for their remaining lives. The women in the simulations retire three
years later, simply reflecting that they are three years younger than the
men. Because the median earnings of men exceed those for women,
the Social Security OASI benefit based on a man's earnings history
exceeds the benefit based on a woman's work record. As a result,
husbands and widowers will always elect to take their own benefit.
Wives choose between their own benefit and one-half of their hus-
band's, while widows may elect to receive their own benefit or the
benefit which their husband would receive were he alive and had not
worked since the year he actually died. In other words, a woman whose
husband died in 1965 could take the benefit he would be receiving had
he stopped working in 1965 and lived to receive his benefit, or she
could take her own benefit. In the two-earner cohort, her benefit is
based on her earnings from 1940 to her retirement in 1988, while in the
one-earner cohort her benefit is based on a shorter work history, 1965-
88, since we assume she only begins work upon her husband's death.
This means that a widow's benefit may depend on when her husband
died (and in the one-earner case must depend on it), necessitating our
keeping track of the "widow cohorts" mentioned above.238 J. B. Shoven/J. 0. Sundberg/J. P. Bunker
Wives over the age of 65 whose husbands are still alive will always
receive one-half of their husband's benefit in the one-earner family,
since they have no earnings history of their own. In the two-earner
family, since they have no earnings history of their own. In the two-
earner case, wives will take their own benefit since their benefit exceeds
half their husband's, given our earnings series. All benefits are cal-
culated in real dollars, so comparison of 1985 and 1988 benefits is valid.
The results for singles are shown in table 8.3. All figures are stated
in 1985 dollars, and the real discount rate used for cash flows occurring
at other times is 3 percent. With those assumptions, the figures in the
upper portion of the table for single men with median wage profiles in
this cohort show that nonsmokers can expect to receive a net transfer
from Social Security of $3,436, while the expected benefits received
by smokers fall $17,782 short of the expected contributions. All of
these figures are conditional on having survived to age 20. The Social
Security cost of smoking for single men with median earnings patterns
thus exceeds $21,000. The internal rate of return, which equates the
expected value of payouts and payins, is 1.87 percent real for smokers
and 3.17 percent for nonsmokers. If one only looked at those who
survived until 65, the rates of return would naturally be higher. In that
case, the real internal rate of return for median wage male smokers in
this cohort is 3.18 percent, whereas the rate for nonsmokers is 3.78
percent. The dollar difference in the net transfer between male smokers
and nonsmokers, conditional on surviving to 65, is still about $14,500.
Table 8.3 indicates that the Social Security cost of smoking is smaller
for single women than for single men. In general single women get a
higher rate of return from Social Security for two reasons. First, they
have longer life expectancies, and, second, they have lower earnings
and the system is progressive. Conditional on age 20, the difference in
the net transfer to median wage women nonsmokers and smokers is
slightly more than $9,000. The real internal rate of return for smoking
women is 3.45 percent, while the figure is 3.87 percent for nonsmokers.
Conditional on reaching age 65, the dollar difference between smoking
and not is about $6500 for median wage single women.
The lower portion of table 8.3 shows the results for single individuals
with earnings 60 percent of the median for their age and cohort. The
loss due to smoking in the expected transfer from Social Security is
almost $17,000 for men and $7,000 for women at this earnings level.
We conclude that the Social Security cost of smoking is not terribly
sensitive to earnings levels.
The corresponding results for one- and two-earner married couples
with median earnings profiles are shown in table 8.4. One-earner cou-
ples receive larger transfers and a higher rate of return from Social
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The Social Security expected cost of smoking is similar for couples in
either circumstance. The net expected present value of participation
in Social Security is $29,468 lower for one-earner couples who both
smoke relative to one-earner couples where neither spouse smokes. If
only the man smokes, the loss in the expected transfer from the system
is $19,199, whereas if only the wife smokes the loss is $9,732, relative
to a one-earner couple in which neither smokes. To put these figures
in perspective, one might note that the median earnings of 64-year-old
men in this cohort were $20,315. Thus, the Social Security loss for
both smoking amounts to almost 1.5 years labor income. In fact, the
loss is slightly greater than that given that Social Security benefits are
taxed more favorably than labor income.
The numbers for two-earner couples are that their expected net Social
Security transfer is $30,567 less if both spouses smoke than if neither
does. The real internal rate of return for two-earner couples in which
both smoke is 2.95 percent, whereas it is 3.68 percent if neither smokes.
The cost of the husband only smoking is $19,950, and the cost of the
wife only smoking is $10,482. For reference, the median annual earnings
of women is about $12,500, so the loss if they both smoke is roughly
equivalent to 2.4 years of the wife's earnings.
Table 8.5 contains the results for low-wage one- and two-earner cou-
ples. For one-earner couples, we find that the cost of both smoking is
roughly $22,600. For two-earner couples, the cost of both smoking is
$23,500. Once again, the cost is roughly twice as large for men as it is for
women. The dollar costs to smoking are greater relative to earnings for
low-wage households than for median earners.
The gain in Social Security benefits that accrue to the nonsmoker,
or to the smoker who quits, represents an equal and opposite drain on
Social Security funds. This drain is only partially offset by the increase
in preretirement taxes paid by nonsmokers and ex-smokers in com-
parison with smokers, a substantially greater number of whom die
prematurely. The potential cost to society, including the government,
of a successful antismoking program has not gone unnoticed. In 1971,
the British government, in response to a recommendation by the Royal
College of Physicians to mount an antismoking campaign, estimated
that such a campaign would save money in the short run. However,
by the year 2000, they forecasted that a 40 percent reduction in cigarette
smoking would result in a net loss to the government of 29 million
pounds due to additional benefits received by surviving ex-smokers.
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, in its recent re-
port "Smoking-Related Death and Financial Costs" (Kronebusch 1985),
indicated that, in the event of a reduction of smoking, "there will be
some increase in revenues to the government and the Social Security






































































































































































iu c 2 3243 The Social Security Cost of Smoking
The increase in these revenues, however, may not equal the additional
costs borne by these programs for the additional retirees" (p. 33).
Limiting her attention to Medicare's hospital insurance fund, Wright
(1986) has estimated that the individual 45-year-old male who quits
smoking will cost the fund between $204 and $2,745.
We have emphasized the extent to which smoking reduces the ex-
pected value of Social Security payments below that of nonsmokers.
We need to remember that because of the nature of the system, a drop
in the number of smokers will provide a cost; every person who begins
to smoke implicitly decreases the future liability of the system. The
prevalence of smoking is an important factor in determining the finan-
cial viability of the system.
The percentage of U.S. adults who smoke has fallen drastically in
the last 20 years. In 1965, 52 percent of men and 35 percent of women
age 20 and older smoked; by 1983 the numbers fell to 35 percent and
30 percent, respectively (Health United States 1984). This should result
in an increase in the average life span; since the majority of these people
are below retirement age, we should expect retirees in the future to
live longer on average than current retirees, who are already living
longer than previous retirees due to the reduced use of cigarettes. A
higher percentage of all workers will live to retirement; those who do
will collect benefits for a longer period. This should be reflected in the
demographic projections upon which Social Security taxes and benefits
are based.
The trend toward fewer smokers has been a long one, especially
among men. Unless that trend was adequately projected, we expect
Social Security demographic projections to be too low. While the 1958
and 1966 Actuarial Studies by the Social Security Administration do a
good job of predicting 1980 total population levels, they predict too
high a number of young people and too low a number of retired persons.
This implies offsetting errors, perhaps forecasting a longer "baby boom"
than actually occurred and underestimating the additions to life ex-
pectancy, some of which can be attributed to lower smoking levels.
This hurts the system twice; more retirees are currently drawing ben-
efits than projected, and fewer workers will be paying taxes in the
future than projected.
Our simulations suggest that each median-wage male smoker in the
1920 birth cohort roughly "saves" the Social Security system $20,000,
and each median-wage female smoker saves $10,000. To get an ap-
proximate idea of the aggregate effect of smoking by members of this
cohort on Social Security, we can multiply these saving figures by the
number of smokers born in 1920. The result indicates that if no one
had smoked in this cohort, the net transfer to this population from
Social Security would have been $14.5 billion greater. As this reflects244 J. B. Shoven/J. 0. Sundberg/J. P. Bunker
only the change for those born in one year, one can easily see that the
total impact of smoking on the financial circumstances of Social Se-
curity amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars.
While we by no means claim that reduction in smoking is responsible
for all the gains in life expectancy achieved in recent years, we have
demonstrated the enormous potential impact on the system of reduc-
tions in smoking rates. Changes in the prevalence of smoking should
be included in the system's attempts to model future populations.
8.4 Conclusion
The body of literature discussing the economic costs of smoking has
largely ignored private and social costs with regard to Social Security.
Our analysis is a first step in estimating these costs, both in terms of
net benefits to smokers and reduced payments by the system. We find
that the expected loss caused by smoking from participation in Social
Security is a large one from the individual's perspective. The loss for
a median-wage male smoker is about $20,000, or about 11 months of
earnings. The loss for median-wage women is approximately $10,000
or about 10 months of earnings. These losses are quite significant even
compared to the health cost consequences of smoking. We also found
that these losses are not very different for workers with lower wages.
The aggregate implications of our results are that smokers "save"
the Social Security system hundreds of billions of dollars. Certainly
this does not mean that decreased smoking would not be socially ben-
eficial. In fact, it is probably one of the most cost-effective ways of
increasing average longevity. It does indicate, however, that if people
alter their behavior in a manner which extends life expectancy, then
this must be recognized by our national retirement program. Looked
at in this way, it is not surprising that the large potential for increasing
life spans that reduced smoking offers has sizeable consequences for
Social Security.245 The Social Security Cost of Smoking
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Note
1. A mortality ratio is the death rate of smokers divided by the death rate
of nonsmokers of similar age and sex.
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Comment Paul Taubman
Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker have opened up a new area of study
by examining the cost to smokers of being enrolled in the Social Se-
curity system. The cost arises because Social Security stops paying
Paul Taubman is a Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and a
Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.251 The Social Security Cost of Smoking
you when you die (though your spouse may still draw some of your
benefits), and smokers die earlier. That smokers die earlier is well
documented,
1 though it is an open question whether cigarette smoking
causes the earlier death.
My comments will address the issue of how we might improve Shoven
et al.'s estimates and also whether we should be "taxing" smokers.
Their estimates essentially use previously collected information on (1)
life tables of smokers and nonsmokers and (2) typical earnings of in-
dividuals to (3) calculate the expected Social Security benefits of smok-
ers and nonsmokers. Both of the two pieces of information have some
loose ends associated with them.
The life table for smokers and nonsmokers is based on Hammond's
1966 study which calculates death rates by age in the early 1960s. Let
us accept the proposition that Hammond's results provide good esti-
mates for the early 1960s. Since then age-specific death rates have
declined markedly, and his relative death rates need not apply in the
1980s when the authors make their calculations. To illustrate this point,
consider the effect of education on death rates among older males.
Using death data matched to the 1960 Census, Kitagawa and Hauser
(1973) found no difference among the variously educated groups. Using
the 1973 CPS-Social Security Exact Match sample, which takes death
information from Social Security records, Rosen and Taubman (1984)
found the more educated had a 20-25 percent advantage over the least
educated and that this differential persisted amoung those aged 78 and
over, which is the remainder of the group studied by Kitagawa and
Hauser. A more recent set of life tables based on smoking might yield
different results than Hammond's, especially since work by Behrman,
Sickles, and Taubman (1987) using time-series data for the period 1954—
69 finds a life expectancy differential for smokers only about one-half
as large as those found in Hammond, though Behrman, Sickles, and
Taubman's work is based on a nonrandom sample.
The earnings data used may also be inappropriate given the structure
of Social Security's benefit plan and the possibility that smoking affects
labor market supply via morbidity. Some estimates that were based on
actual earnings data of smokers and nonsmokers would be helpful. In
any event, to sharpen the estimates by marital status which is related
to labor supply, information on actual earnings histories or on benefits
paid would be useful. Such information exists, though the smoking
information may be suspect.
Next, let us turn to the question: Is it fair to tax cigarette smokers?
Of course, a cigarette excise tax already exists which is often justified
on the grounds of improving health, presumably a public policy based
on the grounds that smokers are myopic. There are reasons to tax
smokers. We, as taxpayers, help pay some of the medical bills of cigarette252 J. B. Shoven/J. 0. Sundberg/J. P. Bunker
smokers if they are sicker than the rest of the population or if they are
hospitalized at younger ages, both of which seem plausible. Finally, if
passive smoking harms the nonsmoker, a still open question, then there
is a market failure, which could be corrected by a "tax." Is the tax
contained in the Social Security system optimal for this purpose? I
don't know.
There is also a question of whether the Social Security system should
be thought of as an annuity as the authors do in their analysis. There
is no question that Social Security looks like an annuity, though the
premium and benefit schedules are much different than the private one
I invest in for retirement. Congress, however, now seems mostly con-
cerned with using the Social Security system to provide a socially
adequate standard of living to the elderly. Surely we can find a social
welfare function consistent with this notion, and then the fact that
smokers are penalized as annuitants doesn't matter as long as they
receive a socially adequate income while alive. Perhaps this income
level varies by smoking status, but I don't know if smoking costs are
greater than substitutes such as candy used by nonsmokers.
Finally, one may ask whether the mandatory nature of Social Security
is important or whether we could get to a voluntary first-best solution
with private markets allowing for different life expectancies. Work by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) suggests a stable voluntary equilibrium
may not be possible, though I hasten to add that some current life
insurance policies take not smoking into account, and that insurance
market seems to be functioning. But it may be that a voluntary annuity
market with different life expectancies wouldn't work. We may need
to have policies with one life expectancy used and force some people
to make a bad buy.
Note
1. See the references given by Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker in this paper
and those in Behrman, Sickles, and Taubman (1987).
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